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The paradox of social interaction:  
Shared intentionality, we-reasoning and virtual bargaining 
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Abstract 
Social interaction is both ubiquitous and central to understanding human behavior. Such 
interactions depend, we argue, on shared intentionality: the parties must form a common 
understanding of an ambiguous interaction (e.g., one person giving a present to another requires 
that both parties appreciate that a voluntary transfer of ownership is intended). Yet how can 
shared intentionality arise? Many well-known accounts of social cognition, including those 
involving “mind-reading,” typically fall into circularity and/or regress. For example, A’s beliefs 
and behavior may depend on her prediction of B’s beliefs and behavior; but B’s beliefs and 
behavior depend in turn on her prediction of A’s beliefs and behavior. One possibility is to 
embrace circularity and take shared intentionality as imposing consistency conditions on beliefs 
and behavior; but typically, there are many possible solutions and no clear criteria for choosing 
between them. We argue that addressing these challenges requires some form of we-reasoning; 
but that this raises the puzzle of how the collective agent (the “we”) arises from the individual 
agents. This puzzle can be solved by proposing that the will of the collective agent arises from a 
simulated process of bargaining: agents must infer what they would agree, were they able to 
communicate. This model explains how, and which, shared intentions are formed. We also 
propose that such “virtual bargaining” may be fundamental to understanding social interactions. 
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We intuitively explain human behavior, including our own, by giving reasons that may justify 
that behavior (Davidson, 1963; Dennett, 1987). Our reason-based explanations of each other’s 
actions are often multi-layered and complex. So, for example, when buying a used car in cash, 
we may explain why A carefully counts the money and holds it up to the light by her suspicion 
that B is dishonest. We may further explain that B feels affronted, because A is demonstrating a 
lack of trust. Going a step further, we can explain why A remarks, “I suppose I’ve got to go 
through this rigmarole!” to reduce B’s sense of being distrusted, by implying that A makes such 
checks as a matter of routine. 
Many perspectives on social behavior elaborate on these intuitive, reason-based 
explanations of individual thought and behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Bandura, 1982; Fishbein, 
1979; Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Perner, 1991). One direction for such elaboration, rooted in 
cognitive science, focuses on the rich structures of prior knowledge and experience that provide 
flexible “scripts” for common types of interaction (Minsky, 1974; Schank & Abelson, 1977). A 
second focuses on the complex role-playing and turn-taking conversational structure of many 
social interactions (e.g., Goffman, 1959; Haviland & Clark, 1974; Levinson & Torreira, 2015). A 
third focuses on the pragmatic inferences required to infer the meaning of linguistic and non-
linguistic social cues (Clark, 1996; Grice, 1975; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). These and other 
projects go far beyond common-sense by extending and deepening, rather than replacing, reason-
based explanations of social behavior.  
Psychology as a discipline focuses primarily on the individual, and on the mental 
processes of which individual thoughts and behaviors are composed. Thus, psychological 
explanation typically, as in the example above, attributes reasons to individual people. From this 
point of view, organizations, social classes, and nations are not irreducibly ascribed “motives” or 
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“beliefs.” Instead, any idea of reason or agency of a group should be explained purely in terms of 
the motives and beliefs of its members. It has generally been left to other social sciences, such as 
sociology, economics, management, and political science, to explain how group-level agency can 
arise from interactions between the individual human agents of which they are composed.  
Recently, though, psychologists and philosophers have become increasingly interested in 
reason-based explanations that apply to more than one person, as embodied in notions of joint 
action, joint attention, and shared intentionality. We shall use “shared intentionality” broadly, to 
cover any cases in which people reach a commonly agreed interpretation, understanding, 
decision or plan.1 Shared intentionality—including the ability to act, attend, and plan jointly—
has been viewed as a key feature distinguishing humans from other primates (e.g., Call, 2009; 
Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003). Moreover, shared intentionality has been seen as crucial to the 
development of culture (Searle, 1995; Tomasello et al., 2005); as playing a key role in cognitive 
and social development (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007); supporting coordinated physical 
activities (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006); shaping and directing individuals’ attentional 
and emotional resources (Boothby, Clark, & Bargh, 2014; Shteynberg & Apfelbaum, 2013; 
Shteynberg et al., 2014); motivating people to coordinate their efforts (Thomas, DeScioli, Haque, 
& Pinker, 2014); and providing a foundation for language (Clark, 1996; Clark & Brennan, 1991; 
Tomasello, 2008). Indeed, as we shall see below, social interactions of all kinds may often 
involve shared intentionality as a key element.  
 
1 Shared intentionality is the term preferred by Tomasello (e.g., 2005); in philosophy, the term collective 
intentionality is also widely used, though analyzed in a variety of importantly distinct ways (e.g., Bratman, 1993; 
Gilbert, 1989, 2009; Searle, 1990; Tuomela & Miller, 1988). In economics, related research has been developed 
under the heading of team reasoning (e.g., Bacharach, Gold, & Sugden, 2006). Yet further terms, including we-
reasoning and we-thinking, are also widely used (Akerlof, 2016; Hakli, Miller, & Tuomela, 2010). Here, we use 
shared intentionality to cover all these lines of research. Schmid (2012) notes that related ideas about collective 
thought can be traced to figures as diverse as Juergen Habermas (1987), Wilfrid Sellars (1968), R. G. Collingwood 
(1947), and German phenomenologists in the early twentieth century. We will consider below how the specific 
account outlined, based on virtual bargaining, relates to some of these ideas.  
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In philosophy and economics, the question of how or whether shared intentionality can be 
explained in terms of the thoughts and behaviors of individual agents, has been viewed as a 
major theoretical challenge (e.g., Bacharach et al., 2006; Bratman, 1992, 1993; Gilbert, 2006; 
Searle, 1990). By contrast, in psychology, we suggest that the size of the gulf between reason-
based explanation of single individuals and reason-based explanation of the interactions between 
individuals is often not fully appreciated.2 Indeed, it is often assumed that the ability to “read” 
the minds of others may be sufficient, typically with the addition of so-called “higher-order” 
intentionality, recognizing that the others are also mind-readers. In this paper, we will argue that 
this is not the case. 
The problem of “shared,” or “joint,” reasoning to reach some common understanding 
about each other’s thoughts and behavior is, as we shall see, widespread. But it has clear 
boundaries: not all interactions between people have a fundamentally collaborative character 
aiming to establish a common understanding or plan. Consider, for example, situations in which 
one individual interacts with another purely as a physical “object,” whether deliberately pushing 
someone out of the way, or inadvertently knocking them over. Equally, many aspects of social 
interaction are fundamentally one-directional: one party is attempting to interpret the behavior of 
another, ascribing them beliefs and motivations; or one person is attempting to control or 
manipulate the thoughts or behavior of another (e.g., so-called Machiavellian intelligence, 
widely discussed in primatology, e.g., Byrne & Whiten, 1990; de Waal, 2007). Indeed, much 
social behavior is fundamentally competitive, so that each party aims to understand and/or 
control the behavior of the other to their own advantage. In highly competitive interactions, the 
goal is typically not to reach a common understanding, but to outwit the other. Moreover, even 
 
2 There are notable exceptions, including Colman (2003); Colman, Pulford, & Rose (2008); De Freitas, 
Thomas, DeScioli, & Pinker (2019); and Shteynberg et al. (2020). 
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where a common understanding is crucial to successful interaction, this need not be obtained by 
joint reasoning between parties involved. A common understanding of the rules of the road, or 
the rules of tennis, or chess, or indeed linguistic conventions and moral norms, need not be 
created from scratch in interacting with another person, but may be presupposed as part of a 
shared culture.3  
Yet collaborative, shared reasoning can often play a crucial role in even these cases. 
Although pushing another person does not involve collaborative, shared thinking, the evaluation 
of such actions (e.g., as impolite), and whether apology is required, or protest justified, may well 
do. If A pushes B out of the path of an oncoming vehicle that B had not noticed, there may be a 
joint expectation that A will be thanked rather than reprimanded. Similarly, in playing tennis, 
coordinating on when and where to play, or what is appropriate in a warm up involves shared 
intentionality; but in a competitive rally, each player will aim to disguise her intentions from, 
rather than share her intentions with, the other. Moreover, behavior is often guided by the 
interpretation of the rules (e.g., deciding whether a soccer shot is “over the bar” or “hits the post” 
where the goal is marked by two jumpers on a children’s playground). Forming such tacit 
agreements seems paradigmatically to involve shared intentionality (e.g., Searle, 1995). 
Moreover, finding such shared interpretations will be particularly important in verbal 
communication in the light of the highly underspecified nature of linguistic meanings (Grice, 
1975; Levinson, 2000; Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Turner & Horn, 2018) and the need to “anchor” 
those meanings in a specific context of people, objects, locations, and so on (Clark, 2021). But, 
once the rules are commonly established, playing the game itself is not a matter of shared 
 
3 Moreover, social coordination may often arise through the operation of shared cognitive and perceptual 
mechanisms, which align thought and behavior between people. Such mechanistic accounts, as in influential models 
of dialogue in psycholinguistics (e.g., Pickering & Garrod, 2004), lie outside the scope of reason-based explanation 
entirely. 
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intentionality. In chess, for example, the action of “launching an attack on the King” does not 
depend on mutual recognition by both players: indeed, the attack is more likely to succeed if the 
other fails to recognize it. 
Shared intentionality arises where people need to share the interpretations of relevant 
actions; but it is puzzling how such a shared interpretation can arise. Specifically, attempting to 
reach such a shared interpretation runs into what we call the problem of mutual prediction. For 
person A to find a shared understanding of an action with B, person A needs to infer B’s 
understanding of that action. But B’s understanding will, in turn, be shaped by B’s attempt to 
infer A’s understanding. Thus, A’s thoughts and actions depend on B’s; and in turn B’s thoughts 
and actions depend on A’s, in an apparent loop.4 
As we will see, this seemingly innocuous observation is surprisingly problematic, and 
indeed paradoxical, for reason-based accounts of social interaction involving the formation of 
shared intentions. We consider various attempts to address this challenge; and suggest a solution 
using the theory of virtual bargaining (Melkonyan, Zeitoun, & Chater, 2018, 2021; Misyak & 
Chater, 2014; Misyak, Melkonyan, Zeitoun, & Chater, 2014). 
 
Outline of the paradox 
Let us introduce the paradox with a simple example. A passes B a copy of A’s latest book. B has 
to determine the nature of this social interaction from ambiguous clues. Let us limit ourselves to 
two possibilities: that A may be giving (G) the book to B, in which case B should thank A 
 
4 We stress that there is nothing inherently paradoxical in recursion per se, which is, after all, familiar and 
central in computer science, cognitive science, and mathematics (Hofstadter, 1979). The problem is how such 
reasoning can resolve the problem of coordination between people who are operating independently. See, for 
example, Bacharach, Gold & Sugden’s (2006) discussion of the so-called “hi-lo” game, where there are multiple 
equilibria and the need for some rationale by which people can coordinate on the same one.  
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profusely and keep the book; or A may be showing (S) the book to B, in which case B should 
examine it with interest, make suitably obliging remarks, and return it. A shared interpretation is 
crucial for harmonious social interaction. In the language of game theory (Schelling, 1960), 
social interactions require that A and B play a coordination game in order to resolve this 
ambiguity between G or S.5 
At first glance, the challenge of making the correct inference may seem to lie entirely 
with B. That is, B has to engage in some process of mind-reading to establish A’s intention (G or 
S?). But note that A faces the complementary problem: predicting how B will interpret being 
handed the book.  
For both parties, a successful communicative and social interchange requires that their 
interpretations, whether G or S, are the same. Indeed, considerable social confusion and 
embarrassment will result if A believes the book to be a generous gift, yet B hands the book back 
after a brief look and a few perfunctory remarks. Matters may be even worse if A intended B 
merely to inspect the book, but B gushes with thanks about A’s kindness and stubbornly fails to 
release it. 
The two parties face a problem of mutual prediction. In rationally deciding on how or 
whether to pass the book to B, A must ask: will B interpret my action as G or S? But to decide 
this, A must ask what B will think A intends; and B will, of course, assume that A intends 
whatever B will infer from observing P. A and B seem to be reasoning in a circle: A is trying to 
“read” B’s mind; but B is trying to read A’s.  
Thus, mutual prediction seems to lead inexorably to deadlock or infinite regress. We call 
this the paradox of social interaction. The paradox seems to arise widely. In many social 
 
5 The analysis here draws heavily on Clark (1996). 
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interactions, there will be the mutual challenge of inferring what the nature of the interaction is 
from ambiguous information: e.g., who is supposed to play which role and take which actions 
(e.g., Clark, 1996; Goffman, 1959). We stress that the paradox of social interaction is a challenge 
for theorists, rather than individuals. Specifically, the puzzle for theorists is how, given the 
apparent threat of deadlock or regress, people are able to navigate reciprocal interactions with 
other people so deftly.  
Three points are worth stressing. First, any specific ambiguity in a social situation may, 
of course, be resolved, or at least reduced, by one or both parties. The person passing the book 
might present it ostentatiously, in order to clarify that it is a gift; or strongly imply that it is not 
(e.g., by commenting “you can have a look, if you like”). Nonetheless, most social situations will 
retain some measure of ambiguity. For example, even if it is made clear that the book is 
presented for inspection, there remains uncertainty about, for example, how rapidly it should be 
returned, how delicately it should be handled, or whether or not permission is required to scan its 
cover or opening pages with a smartphone. And explicit communication, however extensive, 
never resolves all ambiguities—this is parallel with the observation in legal theory that the law is 
inevitably “open-textured,” and open to further interpretation (Hart, 1994). Indeed, natural 
language itself is notoriously riddled with ambiguities, from the scope of quantifiers, the 
extension of concepts, the reference of names, pronouns, and so on (Sennet, 2016). Thus, the 
challenge of coordinating on a shared understanding through coordination is not eliminated by 
the possibility of communication, but rather recurs in the interpretation of communication. 
Second, disambiguation is itself a subtle and sensitive social action. A’s overzealous 
signaling that the book should be returned will imply a concern that B would otherwise be likely 
to keep it. A’s signaling may impugn B’s level of social competence by implying that B is liable 
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to make social gaffes; or impugn B’s motives by implying that B might be deliberately exploiting 
a potentially ambiguous situation to make off with the book. For such reasons, people will 
typically exercise caution in explicating what otherwise might reasonably be inferred to be the 
shared understanding by both parties.  
Thirdly, note that agreeing on the nature of the social interaction seems to be required 
even where the interaction may be hostile. For example, even an overtly angry act is not thereby 
necessarily hostile. B might furiously tear up A’s book without concern for whether A is 
observing or even present. B’s act is hostile only when it is expressly aimed at conveying A and 
B’s shared recognition of B’s contempt for the book (and perhaps also for its author). Or suppose 
B, avenging some past slight, attempts to insult A by putting the book into the trash. B’s intention 
is that both A and B will agree that this action is an insult to the book’s author, A. If A 
misinterprets B’s behavior as accidental, for example, it will not have the desired insulting effect.  
What makes putting the book into the trash part of a hostile interaction is that A and B 
share the interpretation of the action as a deliberate insult. Thus, B is actively attempting to insult 
A; and B’s success requires that A recognizes this intention; that B recognizes that A has this 
recognition; and so on. In the view of the psychology of language, this understanding of the 
action as an insult is in common ground (Clark, 1996; we will discuss the puzzling notion of 
common ground further below). While common ground is a subtle notion, and one which we will 
use further below, we need only an informal understanding of the idea here: for some piece of 
information to be in common ground for A and B, we require that they both know it; know that 
they each other know it, etc.6 From a mutual prediction perspective, it is hard to see how a 
 
6 Common ground might arise from publicly available information, shared culture, a common perceptual 
environment, collective attention (Shteynberg et al., 2020), or other sources (e.g., Clark, 1996). In economics and 
philosophy, the more usual term is common knowledge, and here we use these terms interchangeably, following, 
e.g., Thomas et al. (2014). The notion can be spelled out formally, either in set theory (e.g., Aumann, 1976) or 
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common ground interpretation of B putting A’s book in the trash can ever arise. A and B seem to 
be led down an endless regress in which each tries to infer how the other would interpret the 
action.  
Social interactions, then, frequently involve generating shared intentions and shared 
understanding from potentially ambiguous cues. This, in turn, seems to generate an apparently 
paradoxical interdependence between A and B: the thoughts and actions of each seem to depend 
on the thoughts and actions of the other. How, then, might we attempt to escape the paradox, and 
deal with the mutual interdependence of A and B’s actions? 
One approach is to embrace circularity: to note simply that there are two “readings” of 
the action which are consistent and, if adopted, will lead to harmonious interaction. On one 
reading, A and B both interpret the physical movements of conveying the book from one person 
to the other as an instance of S; both believe that the other adopts reading S, that the other 
believes that the other believes that they adopt reading S, and so on. On the other reading, both 
interpret the same physical movements as a case of G, with the parallel hierarchy of beliefs, and 
beliefs about beliefs. But the paradox remains: how do the parties know which interpretation to 
agree on?  
It is tempting to suppose that solving coordination problems is, in practice, often made 
easier by a clue or hint. Indeed, A might wave the book towards B very casually, rather than 
slowly and formally, perhaps seeking to imply, “this is no big deal—just have a quick look,” and 
this might seem to imply that A does not intend to give the book as a gift. But notice that any hint 
will work only if both parties agree on the interpretation of the hint (e.g., that it favors S rather 
 
epistemic logic (e.g., Harman, 1977; Schiffer, 1972). There is a debate concerning whether Lewis’ (1969) important 
early formulation is a distinct approach (Cubitt & Sugden, 2003; Vanderschraaf, 1998). Our discussion here does not 
depend on these fine details.  
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than G). But then both parties face a new coordination problem: coordinating on the 
interpretation of the “hint,” and the paradox is just as problematic as before. 
 
Why has the paradox been largely unnoticed in psychology? 
We have suggested that the paradox of social interaction is fundamental. But discussion of this, 
and related, issues is sparse in psychology. There are notable exceptions, including analysis of 
these issues in the context of language and communication (e.g., Clark, 1996), and in social 
(Shteynberg et al., 2020) and developmental (Bohn & Koymen, 2018) psychology. Moreover, 
there is work showing the power of common ground in experimental games (Colman, 2003; 
Colman & Gold, 2017; De Freitas et al., 2019; Thomas et al., 2014); and proposals concerning 
the need for evolved cognitive mechanisms to think “as a group” (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010). 
But given that the centrality of social interaction is so central to human life, it is natural to ask 
why the paradox has not been a major focus of psychological discussion. 
One reason is, we suspect, that humans are so good at resolving such coordination 
problems in practice that their very existence is not noticed: the “right” interpretation of an 
action (e.g., a gift, an insult) seems so obvious that it may seem to require no further explanation. 
Another reason is that a great deal of experimental research, even in social psychology, does not 
involve interaction: indeed, for good reasons of experimental control, paradigms involving the 
interplay of freely interacting agents are often avoided where possible.7  
In short, social interaction is often not the immediate focus of investigation in social 
psychology and related fields. For example, considerable interest has focused on what we might 
 
7 Some authors have argued that experimentally studying social and linguistic interaction is of crucial 
importance. They have not necessarily endorsed the reason-based style of explanation advocated here (Pickering & 
Garrod, 2004, 2021; Schilbach et al., 2013). 
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term social perception (e.g., Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000) or 
mind-reading (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Nichols & Stich, 2003; 
Singer, 2006). Here people infer another person’s mental state from their observed behavior, but 
where the person observed is not simultaneously making an inference about the observer. 
Similarly, there is considerable interest in how a person’s thoughts and behavior are affected by 
people and groups around them. Social influence (e.g., Asch, 1956; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; 
Sherif, 1936) too, need not be reciprocal (although it can be: Mahmoodi, Bahrami, & Mehring, 
2018). A person’s thoughts and behaviors will be shaped by those around them, irrespective of 
whether the converse is true. Another area of intensive research interest is the social 
transmission of thoughts and behaviors through populations and across generations (e.g., Boyd, 
Richerson, & Henrich, 2011; Christakis & Fowler, 2009; Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001). The 
spread of linguistic expressions, gestures, motor skills, levels of aggression, food and alcohol 
consumption, norms of politeness, emotions, rumors, and beliefs is typically considered as 
involving one-way transfer from one agent to another. In each of these important domains, the 
relationship between one agent and the next can be modeled as one-directional, without needing 
to invoke mutual prediction. Table 1 provides an illustrative sample of well-known experimental 
studies in social, developmental, and comparative psychology, under this classification. 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
It is perhaps natural to hope that a theory of social interaction might be created by adding 
a one-directional influence from A to B to a one-directional influence from B to A. But the 
paradox of social interaction illustrates how mutual influence can introduce wholly new 
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phenomena: people must simultaneously and independently infer relevant beliefs, intentions, and 
actions for both parties.8 To the degree that researchers have focused on one-way interactions, 
and anticipated a natural generalization to the two-way case, the paradox of social interaction has 
been largely unnoticed.  
 
The paradox and some current theoretical accounts 
Many influential reason-based theories of social development, cognition, and behavior appear 
either (i) to run into the paradox; or (ii) to leave it unresolved. In the first category are process 
models that, implicitly or otherwise, propose that person A attempts to mind-read person B, 
taking account of the fact that B is attempting to mind-read person A, etc. In the second category 
are models that embrace circularity by defining “equilibrium conditions” under which A’s and 
B’s beliefs and/or actions can be consistent. But, as we noted above, this side-steps the crucial 
question—how do A and B coordinate on which of multiple equilibria to choose (do they both 
see the handing over of the book as giving or showing?).  
The first problem (circularity) applies to prediction-based models, which are widespread 
in the cognitive and brain sciences (Clark, 2013), and have recently been applied to social 
behavior (e.g., Tamir & Thornton, 2018). According to this viewpoint, the brain is a “prediction 
machine” with a fundamental drive to learn by reducing its prediction error. But in the context of 
mutually interdependent social interaction, this approach treats social interaction as a problem of 
mutual prediction, and our paradox hits with full force. If A and B are two “prediction machines” 
each attempting to predict the other, they are seemingly unable to avoid an infinite regress. 
 
8 We leave open the possibility that social perception, influence, and transmission may sometimes involve 
some degree of mutual interaction—indeed, this will be the norm in communicative contexts such as our ‘book 
donating’ example above. Our point is simply that they need not do so. 
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The same issue recurs, independent of the mechanism used to make such predictions. For 
example, consider the simulation-theory of mind (e.g., Goldman, 2006; Gordon, 1986), 
according to which people attempt to mind-read by simulating the thinking of others using their 
own knowledge and reasoning. The essential claim of the simulation-theory is that, rather than 
requiring a “theory” or “model” of the mind of the other, the other’s mind can be predicted by 
using one’s own mind as an analog of the other’s mind. Consider, for example, a criminal 
wondering how to mislead a detective by leaving false ‘clues.’ According to the simulation 
theory, to assess what a detective will infer from seeing a clue, the criminal asks herself what she 
herself would infer from seeing that same clue. This might involve modifying her own beliefs 
appropriately to align with those of the detective. Thus, the criminal might ask what, 
hypothetically, she would infer from a clue, were she not already aware of her own guilt; or what 
she would infer if, like the detective, she were convinced that no crime could be committed by a 
judge or a member of the clergy. Whatever the attractions of this account, it has limited purchase 
on the paradox of social interaction. In such situations, each person is attempting to simulate the 
other. Thus, A needs to simulate B simulating A simulating B, and it is not clear how infinite 
regress can be avoided. The simulation theory just embodies the paradox, rather than helping to 
resolve it.  
The picture is no different for the influential theory-theory of mind (Gopnik & Wellman, 
1992; Wellman, 1992), according to which people infer the mental states of others to best 
explain their behavior. That is, an observer builds a “model” of the thoughts of the other. This 
approach works well for social perception, where one person observes, but does not interact 
with, another person. Indeed, this viewpoint has been productively modelled by extending 
Bayesian methods that have been so successful in capturing the perception of the physical world 
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(e.g., Knill & Richards, 1996; Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011; Yuille & 
Kersten, 2006) and social behavior (Baker, 2012; Baker, Jara-Ettinger, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 
2017; Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2009). 
In social interaction, though, this recursive approach runs into a version of our now-
familiar paradox. Consider A and B’s interaction above. According to the theory-theory 
viewpoint, to understand B, A must have a model of B’s reasoning. But conversely, to understand 
A, B must have a model of A’s reasoning. This seems to imply that A’s model of B’s reasoning 
must contain a nested model of A’s reasoning, which presumably in turn will include a further 
model of B’s reasoning—we have our usual problem of infinite regress. Most psychological 
accounts of this type implicitly or explicitly assume that such recursion is truncated (e.g., 
Tomasello, 2008). That is, people model one another’s beliefs (“first-order” beliefs); perhaps 
also model that others model their own beliefs (“second-order” beliefs); and perhaps 
occasionally extend to the third and fourth order (Liddle & Nettle, 2006).  
A variant of this approach is also embodied in formal theories in behavioral game theory 
(cognitive hierarchy theory (Camerer, Ho, & Chong, 2004) and level-k reasoning (Costa-Gomes 
& Crawford, 2006; Nagel, 1995; Stahl & Wilson, 1994)). This truncated reasoning approach, 
while helpful in analyzing certain kinds of competitive interactions, has difficulties in dealing 
with coordination. Consider, for concreteness, the case where A and B are both second-order 
reasoners. A then tries to do whatever she thinks B thinks he (A) will do.9 But knowing what B 
thinks A will do is at least as difficult as deciding what A will do herself. And B faces a similar 
challenge, trying to establish what A thinks he will do, when he has yet to decide this himself. Of 
 
9 The problem is, in more technical terms, that developing a theory of Level-0 reasoning (which is 
presumed to be the starting point for higher level reasoning) is in these cases just as difficult as solving the original 
problem of deciding what the players will do. In practice, Level-0 reasoning typically, though not always, 
corresponds to a uniform probability distribution over the set of all strategies available to a player.  
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course, agents might use some heuristic to infer these difficult second-order beliefs. But, if so, 
then (a) the entire explanatory burden falls on the heuristics, not the theory of mind-reading; (b) 
if such heuristics existed, both parties should surely apply them directly to determine their own 
behavior, and might avoid becoming lost in unnecessary recursive reasoning; and (c) the 
question of how the heuristics emerge to lead to successful coordination is entirely unaddressed. 
In sum, theories that assume that people’s recursive mind-reading is limited to a finite number of 
levels cannot easily explain how people coordinate successfully in social interactions.10 
The second category of models, as we have noted, embraces circularity, and seeks to 
define a notion of equilibrium, in which the actions and/or beliefs of the parties are consistent 
(although then facing the puzzle of how people are able to coordinate by choosing the same 
equilibrium). This approach is standard in game theory in the form of the Nash equilibrium and 
its many variants. It is also embodied in some sophisticated Bayesian computational models of 
social reasoning in psychology. For example, consider the social interaction of “optimal” 
teaching in which an agent aims to present the information that will be most useful to a learner. 
Shafto, Goodman and Griffiths (2014) define Bayesian equations in which teachers 
(approximately) optimize their choice of an action in the light of their model of the listener; and 
listeners optimize their interpretations of the information from the teacher, based on their model 
of the teacher; and use iterations to enhance their consistency. This approach has been extended 
to deal with pragmatic reasoning, with the creation of rational speech act theory (Frank & 
Goodman, 2012; Goodman & Frank, 2016). This work is interestingly related to the notion of 
 
10 Where levels of mind-reading are evaluated directly, recursive depth is assumed to be very limited. For 
example, behavioral games, such as the “beauty contest” game (Nagel, 1995), are used to measure recursive depth in 
competitive interactions. They typically suggest that people may best-respond to the other (i.e., first-order 
reasoning), or best-respond to a first-order reasoner, but that higher-order reasoning is rare. As a reviewer has 
pointed out, obtaining predictions from level-k reasoning is complicated further by the fact that depth of reasoning 
differs between people, and, indeed, is not consistent across games (Georganas, Healy, & Weber, 2015).  
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“rationalizability” in game theory (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984), in which players’ choices can 
be rationalized as a best-response in the light of some beliefs about the other players (though 
these beliefs need not be correct). As Shafto, Goodman and Griffiths (2014) note, their approach, 
like rationalizability, typically generates many possible solutions. Therefore, some additional 
mechanism is required to select a specific prediction.  
One particularly interesting approach along these lines, which can be viewed as 
formalizing the theory-theory approach, is “action interpretation as inverse planning” (Baker et 
al., 2009; Wang et al., 2021). The aim is to provide a reason-based account of social perception 
by applying a Bayesian analysis-by-synthesis approach, widely used in modelling perception 
(Yuille & Kersten, 2006) and language interpretation (Bever & Poeppel, 2010), to the problem of 
understanding the intentions behind observed actions. The approach begins with prior 
assumptions about the rational planning of actions in the light of goals and beliefs; and uses 
Bayesian inference to invert this model and hypothesize on the goals, beliefs, and plans from the 
observed action. This work provides an elegant account of how it is possible to “read” complex 
beliefs and preferences from behavior. For example, if we see an agent circumspectly skirt an 
area of ground while heading towards a goal, we may tentatively infer that the agent believes 
there is some hidden obstacle or danger that would be encountered on the direct route—
otherwise their behavior would not correspond to an optimal plan.  
Like other approaches to social perception, this strategy would lead to deadlock if 
directly applied to social interactions: A’s optimal plan depends on her inference about B’s 
optimal plan, which in turn depends on B’s inference about A’s optimal plan. The paradox arises 




Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
We-reasoning: social interactions and joint actions 
There is a natural and intuitive way to escape the problem of mutual prediction. According to 
this approach, we should not imagine each person asking: what do you think that I think that you 
think… without limit. Instead, each participant in an interaction should ask: what do we, 
considering ourselves composing a single supra-agent (a team, a group), think we should do? 
Crucially, this perspective involves assigning beliefs, desires, and reasoning processes, not 
merely to individual members of a group or team; but to the group or team considered as a single 
agent. Indeed, extending talk of mental states not just to individuals but to groups is familiar in 
everyday discourse. We speak of a jury believing a criminal to be guilty; a parliament deciding 
to pass a law; or Real Madrid aiming to play entertaining rather than defensive soccer. In such 
contexts, we are saying more than that each individual in the relevant group has a particular view 
(and indeed, individual jurors, for example, might privately dissent). We instead view the group 
as a single collective agent (Gilbert, 1987).11  
Using this viewpoint, then, one way to address the problem of mutual prediction is (i) for 
the two or more interacting individuals to consider themselves as a single collective agent of 
which they are a member; (ii) for each individual to ask how this collective agent should reason 
 
11 A reviewer has pointed out that the sociologist Max Weber influentially raised skepticism about ascribing 
beliefs, intentions, or choices to groups or organizations, unless these can be recast in terms of the beliefs, intentions, 
or choices of the individuals of which these organizations are composed—on the grounds that only individual people 
have a subjective understanding (Verstehen) of their actions. How ascriptions of joint mental states can be ascribed 
to a group based on the mental states of its members has been an important focus in psychology, philosophy, and 
economics, and one to which we return below.  
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and what it might decide; and (iii) for each agent to choose their individual courses of action 
according to the imagined recommendations of the collective agent.   
This type of approach is often referred to as we-reasoning, and has been widely discussed 
and developed in related but distinct ways, across philosophy, economics, and psychology (e.g., 
Bacharach et al., 2006; Gallotti & Frith, 2013; Gilbert, 2006; Hakli et al., 2010; Sugden, 2003; 
Tenenbaum et al., 2011). Indeed, as noted above, we-reasoning, under the label of “shared 
intentionality,” has been proposed as a distinctive feature of human cognition (e.g., Tomasello & 
Rakoczy, 2003). Of particular interest, in terms of underlying cognitive mechanisms, is the 
concept of shared or joint attention, in which it is common ground that people are attending to 
the same object or event. An extensive program of research in social psychology has found that 
people preferentially devote cognitive and emotional resources to items they believe to be “co-
attended” with others (e.g., Boothby et al., 2014; Shteynberg & Apfelbaum, 2013; Shteynberg et 
al., 2014). Shteynberg et al. (2020) develop this viewpoint further, with notions of collective 
attention and collective learning, which seem to be crucial to coordinating group behavior. These 
ideas help clarify the underpinnings of we-reasoning: for a group of people to share thoughts and 
intentions, they need minimally to be collectively attending to the same information and 
collectively attempting to solve the same problem.  
The notion of we-reasoning does, though, raise a substantial theoretical challenge: How 
can an apparently mysterious collective agent arise from the thoughts and actions of individual 
agents?  
One clue concerning how to proceed is to consider the status of the conclusion that is 
sought: for example, that given relevant background knowledge, situational factors, and the 
nature of the action, we should agree that this is an act of, say, giving (G) rather than showing 
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(S). But presumably we can only derive conclusions based on premises that we endorse: i.e., 
from information that is in common ground (Clark, 1996).12  
So, for example, suppose that it is in common ground that A just said to B: “I’ll be really 
interested in your thoughts about my new book,” and handed B the book after signing it with a 
fountain pen. In the light of this information, it seems overwhelmingly likely that A is giving the 
book to B. Indeed, this would surely be the presumption of a disinterested third party observing 
the interaction. If this inference is itself in common ground, then the interpretation G will also be 
in common ground. Thus, B can safely thank A, and hold on to the book, without fear of social 
disaster.  
The reason-based explanation that spells this out more fully turns out to be surprisingly 
subtle. To interpret the intention behind A’s action, B must ask: in the light of the knowledge of 
this situation that is in common ground for both of us, what is the natural interpretation of this 
action? That is, what would a disinterested third party, sharing this common ground, conclude 
about A’s intention (G or S?). Similarly, in generating the action, A should follow the same 
reasoning to assign an intention to her own action. Thus, in choosing her action with the aim that 
the social interaction will run smoothly, A must ask: what action can I take such that we would 
both agree that the intention is G (or S, depending on whether A wants to give, or merely show, 
the book to B).  
One way to put this point is to see social interactions as a type of shared mental activity 
(even if the action, such as giving or showing, is conducted by only one partner).13 There may, of 
course, be additional layers of social complexity, which will be outside the scope of we-
 
12 Indeed, if one party uses private knowledge not available to the other person to choose their 
interpretation, this will likely disrupt coordination, because the other cannot “follow” the same line of reasoning. 
13 The viewpoint requires a ‘rich’ notion of joint action, which we endorse; but some theorists propose more 
minimalist accounts (e.g., Vesper, Butterfill, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2010). 
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reasoning. For example, in handing over the book for inspection, A may hope to impress B, but 
probably does not want B to realize this. Similarly, B may infer that A is self-important, but 
assume that this is definitely not in common ground. Or A may suddenly fear that B will see her 
actions as boastful. The shared mental activity, though, is what makes this a social interaction, 
rather than simply one person attempting to manipulate or understand another.  
The behavior arising from such shared mental activity can then be interpreted via inverse 
planning that we described above (Baker et al., 2009), but now at the level of the collective 
agent. Thus, the intention of the action (say, G) is derived by inferring what we (i.e., the 
collective agent with the common ground of A and B) would have to jointly intend, were we to 
decide to choose that A perform this action. Given that A has performed this action, we can then 
infer from common ground that we must have had that intention. In particular, if B can infer that 
this intention is in common ground (in the light of the observed action—e.g., handing over the 
book in a particular manner), then B can infer that A has that intention G. Anything that is in 
common ground must be known to both A and B; and hence, can be inferred by B.  
From this “joint planning based on common ground” standpoint,14 we can explain why 
certain features of the action would suggest one interpretation or the other. For example, opening 
the book and writing something in it makes sense according to the plan, “A signs and gives a 
 
14 This viewpoint is closely linked with important recent computational work in a Bayesian framework on a 
somewhat different, and in some ways more challenging problem (Kleiman-Weiner, Ho, Austerweil, Littman, & 
Tenenbaum, 2016; Wang et al., 2021). In this work, the agents do not have the “payoffs” of possible combinations 
of actions in common ground, but must learn them from experience; and they must also learn the “utilities” of 
others, and whether the others are collaborating for the benefit of the team, or are maximizing their own rewards 
(Kleiman-Weiner et al., 2016). More recently, Wang et al. (2021) propose an interesting algorithm, Bayesian 
delegation, in which each agent attempts to infer the tasks of the entire set of agents using Bayesian inference from 
observing their actions. The payoffs to each agent depend on the interaction of different agents on a task (e.g., 
collaborating on some subtasks, distributing other subtasks between themselves). Here, the focus is on learning 
about, and hence coordinating appropriately, with other agents, by observing their actions over long periods of 
interaction. By contrast, the approach that we develop below, virtual bargaining, focuses on the complementary 
problem of how agents can instantaneously find a common plan, by reaching an agreement through a process of 
hypothetical bargaining.  
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book to B.” But it is utterly unnecessary in the light of the plan, “A shows B a book for a 
moment.” By contrast, pointing out a curious detail of the cover while handing over the book is a 
natural part of a plan in which A allows B to inspect a small and difficult-to-see quirk of the 
cover design. But it is unnecessary in the action of making a gift. Although explicating this 
reasoning is conceptually subtle, the degree to which it is reliable can in practice be assessed 
straightforwardly. Any disinterested third party with an understanding of the relevant common 
ground can decide how plausibly the conclusion follows. 
The focus on the importance of common ground provides a basis for a reason-based 
understanding of some of the subtleties of everyday social interactions. Suppose, for example, 
that C whispers to B that A is giving the book away to everyone and that B should be ready to 
receive it. In this case, B now knows A’s intention to give the book to B, and A of course also 
knows her own intention to do so. But the intention is not in common ground: for example, B 
does not know that A knows that B knows it. And this is crucial. Suppose that A were to casually 
pass a copy of the book to B. B cannot then say, “Oh, such a generous present!” —indeed, this 
will be viewed by A as presumptuous, and by B as a terrible faux pas. Rather, B must wait until A 
signals that the gesture is a gift that will be in common ground, so that the information to 
underpin the conclusion that “this is a gift” can be inferred by we-reasoning. Furthermore, 
suppose that A overheard C’s whisper. Nonetheless, A will feel consternation at B’s claiming the 
book “all too readily”—because although A knows that B is expecting the gift, B behaves as if 
this expectation is in common ground (i.e., derived from we-reasoning), where it is not.  
The invocation of common ground, rather than layers of mind-reading the other who is 
mind-reading us, breaks the circularity of the paradox of social interaction. But it raises puzzles 
of its own. In particular, from an individualistic perspective, the challenges of deciding 
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definitively whether some of the knowledge, K, is in common ground might seem to involve a 
particularly complex mind-reading challenge: A might seem to need to establish that both she 
and B know K, that they both know each other know K, and so on. If common ground is viewed 
as depending on an infinite hierarchy of beliefs about beliefs about beliefs, then establishing 
common ground itself sinks into paradox.  
How can we possibly establish an infinite sequence of nested epistemic claims? In line 
with other authors (e.g., Clark, 1996; Shteynberg et al., 2020), we stress that common ground 
cannot be rooted in inferences from individual knowledge. For example, Clark (1996) notes that 
we may sometimes directly infer information common between us (e.g., an announcement over a 
public address system; a salient object that is in plain view for us both; or “well-known” facts, 
e.g., that we learn at school; norms routinely used by everyone in our community; or facts that 
anyone in our company must have learned in their induction, etc.). Thus, common ground can 
often be inferred directly, and the infinite sequence of nested epistemic claims can then be 
inferred as a consequence. Thus, A may assume that she and B have common ground that Paris is 
the capital of France, from the fact that capital cities are routinely learned at school; and then can 
infer that B knows this (because A and B were both present in the class when the teacher 
informed them that Paris is the capital of France, and they observed each other paying attention), 
that B knows that A knows this; that B knows that A knows that B knows it, and so on.15  
 
Virtual bargaining 
We noted earlier that the social sciences have a long tradition of explaining the behavior of 
groups in terms of interactions between the individuals of which they are composed. Indeed, this 
 
15 We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.  
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viewpoint is particularly strong in psychology, where social behavior is explained through the 
lens of individual minds. From this point of view, a crucial theoretical challenge is to establish 
the preferences or goals of any postulated supra-personal entity (the “we” in we-reasoning), 
perhaps from the preferences and goals of the individuals of which it is formed.16 
One approach is to assume that the “supra-agent” is benevolent towards its members, 
perhaps aiming to maximize their summed utilities (e.g., Bacharach et al., 2006; Colman & Gold, 
2017). This approach faces the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons (Diamond, 1967; 
Elster & Roemer, 1993; Weymark, 2016) as well as the difficulty of taking into account the 
possibility that individuals never completely abandon their own objectives for those of the group.  
A more fundamental problem arises from social interactions in which power is very 
unbalanced. Suppose, for example, X is a gangster and Y a downtrodden and fearful side-kick. If 
X passes a valuable stolen watch to Y, Y will interpret this as “showing” and return it right away. 
But if Y hands a stolen watch to X, X will keep it. Of course, if X is very rich and Y is very poor, 
summed utilities might be maximized if the watch is owned by Y not X; and a ‘benevolent’ team 
might thus choose to assign the item to Y (Bacharach et al., 2006). But this will be irrelevant for 
understanding the social interaction between the gangster and side-kick: this particular ‘team’ 
will agree that the watch will go to the less-needy but all-powerful gangster. Power relations, 
although of huge importance in understanding social interactions (Guinote & Vescio, 2010), are 
orthogonal to questions of unconditional aggregate utility maximization. 
A further complication arises when, as is often the case, A and B must both coordinate 
their behavior but have partially conflicting interests. Suppose A and B are at a beach-side 
 
16 Some theorists suggest that such a reduction may not be possible (e.g., Searle, 1990)—that we-thinking 
needs to be taken as primitive, and not reduced to the mental states of individuals. We shall see shortly that virtual 
bargaining can be viewed as a particular way of reconciling a distinct “plural subject” (Gilbert, 1989) as being both 
distinct from, but compatible with, the minds of individual participants (Bratman, 1992, 1993). 
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restaurant with magnificent sea views. A square table at which they must be seated has one chair 
facing the sea with an excellent view (Good), but the opposite chair has no view at all (Bad). The 
other two chairs face side-on, both having a partial sea view (Medium1 and Medium2). Let us 
assume, plausibly, that A and B must sit opposite to each other (the table is quite small). So, 
either one person has Good and the other Bad; or they both get Medium outcomes. 
 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
Note, first, that models based on the Theory-Theory or Simulation-Theory of Mind, and 
prediction-based models, will be at a loss to deal with this scenario: the paradox is in full force. 
Either theory of mind-reading will propose that A tries to model B’s reasoning (presumably to 
take the opposite chair, to avoid social disharmony); but then B will be attempting to model A’s 
reasoning—and we have gone in a circle. And according to prediction-based models, both people 
are engaged in a deadlock of mutual prediction.  
How far does we-reasoning take us? Let us start by considering what can be inferred 
from common ground. There are three possible joint outcomes, with payoffs [UA=H; UB=L], 
[UA=L; UB=H] and [UA=M; UB=M]. So, A and B are facing a coordination problem: ideally, they 
would identify the same option and smoothly instantiate it. But can they avoid choosing 
incompatible options leading to social confusion and embarrassment?  
We suggest that the following line of argument presents a promising theoretical direction. 
Notice that deciding which of the outcomes is most appropriate requires a mechanism for trading 
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off A’s and B’s conflicting interests. If A and B were to communicate, then they might be able to 
decide on a trade-off by negotiation.17 But in many cases it may be sufficiently obvious to A and 
B what conclusion this negotiation would reach that communication is unnecessary. Thus, we 
have a candidate mechanism to guide social interaction in the absence of communication—both 
parties need merely implement what they would have negotiated. We have elsewhere called this 
mechanism virtual bargaining (e.g., Melkonyan et al., 2018, 2021; Misyak & Chater, 2014; 
Misyak et al., 2014). 
What, then, is the basis for the judgments concerning the “obvious” agreement? Note 
that, if such an agreement is to follow from reason-based explanation, any conclusion concerning 
the outcome of virtual bargaining must be in common ground: both players must be able to infer 
that they both know it, know that the other knows it, and so on. Imagine, in our sea view 
example, that A and B are rival business people, with no fellow-feeling. Nonetheless, person A 
has the “trump card” of living in the middle of a continent, and not having seen the sea for many 
years; whereas person B is a local who sees the sea every day. Both would prefer the sea view; 
and each has researched the other’s background—so both know about A’s trump card. 
Nonetheless, if this is not in common ground (i.e., they do not know what background research 
the other has done), then it would be socially highly inappropriate for A to make a dash for the 
chair with the sea view, and B would react with consternation.  
Reflection on examples of this kind suggest that virtual bargaining must derive the 
conclusion that “if we could communicate, we would agree to this” from common ground. The 
 
17 A reviewer has pointed out that deadlocks can still occur, even when communication is available, such as 
when two people, not sure who is next in the checkout line, end up politely trading “You go first!” “No, you go!” 
“No, really, you go ahead” “No, I’m sure you were here before me” sometimes to the point of mutual irritation. 
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decisive inferential step is moving from this common-ground hypothetical to each carrying out 
the inferred action.18  
As in the examples above, what counts as the “natural” bargain in the light of common 
ground can, in general, be assessed by third parties, given that common-ground information. 
Indeed, when A and B are assessing what bargain they might hypothetically reach, they are 
attempting to adopt such a dispassionate stance. If they are able to do this successfully and a 
unique natural bargain emerges, then a harmonious interaction is likely to result. In practice, a 
full range of cognitive shortcomings (e.g., self-serving biases; projection of one’s own interests 
to the other; the curse of knowledge) have the potential to derail this process and may lead to a 
dissonant social interaction. But, we suggest, social interactions can be understood as striving 
towards the objective of implementing a virtual negotiation based on common ground. Indeed, 
this framework is especially helpful in understanding attempts to forestall or repair dissonant 
interactions, for example, by A saying “wow, I’ve not seen the sea for 20 years” as A and B walk 
towards their table or stand at the table struggling with the choice of seats. 
Note, too, that the virtual bargaining viewpoint naturally captures the impact of power 
asymmetries. If gangster X and side-kick Y approach the restaurant table, X will head directly for 
the best seat, and Y for the worst. Both can infer that this would be the outcome were they to 
bargain (i.e., X has overwhelming bargaining power); hence they simply implement the result of 
this hypothetical bargain without needing to communicate.  
 
18 A fruitful line of future research is to consider principles of counterfactual or hypothetical thinking 
observed in other domains, whether hypothetical reasoning about the physical world, or about individual behavior 
(Byrne, 2005; Roese, 1997). For example, we might expect that bargains that involve easily imagined changes from 
the status quo will be preferred (Kahneman & Miller, 1986); that people will consider only a very small number of 
possible bargains (Byrne, 2005; Johnson-Laird, 1983); and that they will be particularly likely to alight on salient or 
focal bargaining solutions (Schelling, 1960). Perhaps especially intriguing is the finding that social power may shape 
how readily people imagine that they might act differently (Scholl & Sassenberg, 2014). It is interesting to wonder 
whether this effect will carry over to tasks involving joint planning through virtual bargaining. 
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How far can virtual bargaining be modelled formally? In specific contexts, where common 
ground, including payoffs, is well-defined (e.g., in laboratory experimental games or economic 
transactions), this is possible. Indeed, we have developed a game-theoretic model, with 
equilibrium conditions (‘feasible agreements’) that possible bargains must fulfil (e.g., 
Melkonyan et al., 2018, 2021; Misyak & Chater, 2014; Misyak et al., 2014). To choose between 
feasible agreements and alight where possible on a single virtual bargain, the model needs to 
draw on a theory of bargaining (after all, this is what virtual bargainers are attempting mentally 
to simulate). In economics, there are various theories of bargaining where the “best” bargain 
depends only on well-defined “utilities” of the players. Melkonyan et al. (2018, 2021) use the 
most well-known theory, Nash bargaining19 (Nash, 1953), which selects the option that 
maximizes the product of utility gains for the players for the bargain (over and above the utilities 
that would be obtained if bargaining failed). But other theories of bargaining could be used 
instead.20  
But as for other aspects of informal reasoning and argumentation, which operate in an 
open-ended and only partially understood world, complete and precise formal analysis of virtual 
bargaining will often not be possible. Indeed, as in common-sense reasoning more generally 
(e.g., Fodor, 1983; Harman, 1986; Oaksford & Chater, 2007), the range of factors that can shape 
the natural bargain is limitless. Nonetheless, our intuitions about what bargain would be reached 
in a hypothetical negotiation are often quite clear cut. Consider the following variants of the 
chair-choosing scenario:  
 
19 Note that Nash bargaining is not connected to the Nash equilibrium mentioned above.  
20 Other theories of bargaining could also be used, e.g., Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining, which focuses on a 
fairness criterion embodied in equalizing the ratio of utility gains (Kalai & Smorodinsky, 1975). 
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i. Person A is the CEO, and B a new employee. The natural agreement will probably be 
that A takes the better seat, and B the worse; and this may be implemented without 
comment. Interestingly, the CEO can “reopen” the negotiation to her potential 
disadvantage, e.g., by edging towards, or just selecting, one of the “Medium” chairs. 
For the new employee to do so would be a social gaffe).  
ii. A and B are good friends; it is in common ground that neither will be happy if the 
other is disadvantaged. They may naturally both select “partial view” seats.  
iii. A and B hardly know each other but are keen to make a good impression (i.e., to 
preserve social harmony). Thus, both know that it will be a faux pas to try to 
“capture” the best seat (i.e., they do not have sufficient common ground to reach any 
particular asymmetrical outcome); and hence they both align on the “partial view” 
seating arrangement (here, unlike in ii., there is no concern about the other’s well-
being). Now it is possible that either A or B may, like the CEO in i., attempt to 
renegotiate to their own disadvantage, e.g., by gesturing the other towards the seat 
with the sea view. If accepted, this may be interpreted as a friendly act. On the other 
hand, it may be viewed as overly ingratiating and insincere, perhaps as attempting to 
imply concern for the other’s well-being, which seems to have no basis.  
 
The aim of our arguments is to illustrate the structure of the social reasoning in which we 
routinely engage—the types of considerations that matter, the importance of what is in common 
ground, and the we-reasoning and virtual bargaining through which people strive to create 
implicit agreements underscoring harmonious social interactions. Once this structure is clear, it is 
possible to define precise formal models and make experimental predictions for specific 
30 
situations, based on assumptions about the social participants’ common ground (of, e.g., their 
action alternatives and their payoffs) (e.g., Melkonyan et al., 2018, 2021).  
 
Implications 
We have argued that social interaction typically involves a mutual adjustment of thought and 
behavior, and that a reason-based explanation of this process cannot operate by a process of 
mutual prediction, on pain of circularity. Instead, coordination is achieved, where it can be 
achieved at all, by a process of simulated bargaining between the people involved in an 
interaction, where the outcome of that simulation is based only on their common ground (and is 
not any knowledge that is provided to one person). Here, we consider implications and 
applications of the paradox and its solution using virtual bargaining.  
The paradox of social interaction and theories of shared intentionality. Psychological 
theorizing has drawn extensively on philosophical analyses of shared intentionality and related 
concepts. How does the present discussion, both of the paradox of social interaction and of the 
proposed solution via virtual bargaining, relate to such analyses? Most fundamentally, the focus 
here is on how people are able to alight upon, and carry out, a coordinated plan—through 
simulating the process of agreeing on a plan based on the participants’ common ground. The 
variety of philosophical analyses typically have a complementary goal: to analyze what it means 
to have a shared plan, rather than resolving the problem of how such plans are selected. Indeed, 
the problem is often sidestepped by assuming that a common plan is articulated linguistically, 
e.g., “let’s move the table” or “we’re going to the store.” Indeed, Tuomela (2005) explains his 
account metaphorically by imagining a publicly visible plan (e.g., of roles and responsibilities in 
cleaning a park), to which participants can equally publicly “sign up.”  
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It is clear, though, that much coordinated action occurs with little or no explicit verbal 
interaction. Even where verbal agreements are formulated, these are typically incomplete. Thus, 
when two people walk to the coffee shop together, there is no explicit agreement to go at the 
same pace, and not to hop, walk backwards, stop unexpectedly, make a long phone call, and so 
on. But these “ground-rules” and many more are nonetheless implicitly agreed, as is evident by 
the fact that to violate one of them would require an explanation or apology (e.g., Garfinkel, 
1967).21  
Pluralistic ignorance. Building on our previous example (in which an agent believes the 
others are anarchists, where none in fact are), interesting implications emerge from the fact that 
the virtual bargain depends only on common ground for the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance 
(e.g., Prentice & Miller, 1993). Thus, everybody at a party may believe that it is in common 
ground that students at a particular university like to binge drink, and disapprove of anyone who 
does not, even though each party may actually disapprove of binge drinking and privately envy 
those who avoid it. This has the perverse consequence that each individual may subscribe to the 
presumed result of the virtual bargain and affirm that “we plan to drink heavily tonight” even 
 
21 Virtual bargaining may help reconcile a dispute in the philosophy of shared intentions. According to 
Bratman (e.g., 1992, 1993), a joint commitment or shared intention requires each member of a group to be 
personally committing to carrying out their part in a joint plan. According to Gilbert (1987, 2006), it requires instead 
the group to be committed “as a body,” which cannot be reduced to commitments of individual members. The plot 
of a G. K. Chesterton (1908) novel illustrates how these views appear to diverge. A group of seven putative 
anarchists plot to overthrow the state, not realizing that none are genuine anarchists (indeed, six are undercover 
detectives). Gilbert’s account allows that the group intended, as a body, to overthrow the state. Bratman’s account 
denies this because its individual members do not have this intention.  
The virtual bargaining account helps capture both perspectives. Given their common ground (crucially not 
including each individual’s private knowledge of being a detective), each putative anarchist believes that the virtual 
bargain is to individually and collectively overthrow the state and behaves in accordance with the bargain. 
Moreover, as Gilbert notes, each member of the group will anticipate, and probably receive, sanction from the others 
if they fail to “play their part.” Thus, it is the existence of this virtual bargain that makes the group committed to the 
plot “as a body.” But each individual has private knowledge (that they are detectives) which at some point will cause 
them to betray the plot. Thus, in line with Bratman’s account, the plot is in a sense entirely illusory, because no 




though each person would rather not—indeed, it might be the case that were the students to have 
a discussion, they might discover that they would all prefer to play table tennis or watch a movie. 
In these circumstances, virtual bargaining would have failed correctly to simulate the outcome of 
real bargaining—because people are unaware of each other’s true preferences. Yet there is also a 
second possibility: that virtual bargaining might correctly predict that actual discussion would 
favor heavy drinking over a movie, even though this might violate each person’s individual 
preferences, because contributions to the discussion would be shaped to conform with the 
expected consensus. That is, in some circumstances, real bargaining would lead to the perverse 
outcome, because people would be unwilling to reveal their private preferences through pressure 
to conform; and if people correctly mentally simulate this through virtual bargaining, virtual 
bargaining will have the same perverse result. Thus, virtual bargaining can become a self-
enforcing mechanism in contexts of pluralistic ignorance: simulating the presumed agreement 
suppresses ‘honest’ expression of preferences, and (i) makes that agreement likely were overt 
discussion to occur; (ii) makes overt discussion less likely, as the result is presumed to be already 
known. Indeed, we suggest that virtual bargaining may be crucial to the stability of a variety of 
group behaviors that are out of line with individual preferences. Few of us enjoy being on the 
losing side of a debate; so, mentally simulating the outcome of such a debate may cause us to 
stifle our dissent, so that the debate never takes place at all.  
The nature and origin of common ground. As we have noted, virtual bargaining and we-
reasoning more broadly between two or more people can only proceed on the basis of their 
common ground. This raises the questions of what common ground can be assumed, how 
information enters common ground, and how people are able to establish what is in common 
ground when uncertainty prevails. 
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The now-familiar problem of infinite regress rules out the possibility of inferring 
common ground from private knowledge. Thus, to adapt an example from Clark (1996), if A 
privately knows that B is from New Zealand, then A will likely assume that B knows the name of 
the current Prime Minister of New Zealand (among many other things). But this conclusion is 
not in common ground. Indeed, B has no way of knowing that A knows it, because A’s premises 
are private. But if B simply tells A that she is from New Zealand, then this information is put in 
common ground, and the conclusions may be in common ground also.  
The requirement that conclusions in common ground can only be based on premises in 
common ground has surprisingly strong implications. A notable feature of everyday world 
knowledge is that it is a densely interconnected and interdependent network (e.g., Fodor, 1983; 
Quine & Ullian, 1978), such that typical inferences (e.g., from being a New Zealander, to almost 
certainly knowing the name of the current Prime Minister of New Zealand) depends on 
background knowledge about what New Zealand is and what a Prime Minister is, which 
themselves depend on further knowledge about geography, politics, and much more. Indeed, 
each piece of knowledge depends on further background knowledge, and so on, without end.22 
Thus, to avoid infinite regress, entire systems of background beliefs must therefore be 
treated as common ground by all parties. So, rather than attempting to build up common ground 
through individual knowledge, it seems unavoidable that general background knowledge, at 
least, is taken for granted as common ground. From this point of view, common ground may, 
perhaps counterintuitively, be more psychologically basic than individual knowledge. That is, it 
 
22 This observation has been called the “fractal” character of everyday reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 
1998), as each part of the justification for, or explanation of, a belief is as complex as the belief itself. This line of 
thinking has varied intellectual roots: to coherentist, rather than foundationalist, theories in epistemology (Olsson, 
2021); to the origin of the frame problem in artificial intelligence (Pylyshyn, 1987); and to the defeasible nature of 
human reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 2007). 
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may require active cognitive processing for a person to recognize that information that they 
individually know is not in common ground, and to take account of this fact. Such processing is 
often effortful and not fully carried out. Indeed, this provides a new perspective on the so-called 
“curse of knowledge” (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Weber, 1989) in which people consistently 
assume that others know what they themselves know. The curse of knowledge can lead to poor 
outcomes in economic bargaining (Camerer et al., 1989); to difficulties in reasoning about false 
beliefs for both children and adults (Birch & Bloom, 2007); and to a tendency for the sender of a 
message to underestimate how difficult the receiver may find it to decode (Newton, 1990). 
Specifically, we suggest that the curse of knowledge should be viewed as following from the 
unavoidable default assumption that one’s knowledge is in common ground.  
The ability to communicate and interact successfully with others will depend, of course, 
on how far these assumptions of common ground are correct. If people’s assumptions about 
common ground are largely aligned in a specific context, then they will interpret each other’s 
behavior in the same way, and social interaction is likely to proceed smoothly. The importance 
of shared common ground in coordinating social behavior may help explain the strong positive 
affect associated with perceiving that we have a shared perspective with others, and the strong 
negative affect when we do not. Crucially, as Shteynberg et al. (2020) point out, this positive 
affect is generated not merely by the shared common ground, but by shared attentional focus 
being directed on the existence and relevance of this common ground. Similarly, the subjective 
experience of I-sharing—the momentary subjective experience of sharing a sense of self with 
another person—may reflect awareness of common ground assumptions being strengthened 
(e.g., if we face a common challenge or trauma, mimic each other’s behavior, sing or dance in 
synchrony, and so on, Pinel, Long, Landau, Alexander, & Pyszczynski, 2006). The subjective 
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perception of such cognitive alignment with others is one way to understand the important 
concept of “shared reality” (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2009; Higgins, 2019; Rossignac-
Milon, Bolger, Zee, Boothby, & Higgins, 2021). 
Perhaps even more basically, the drive to establish common ground—and hence facilitate 
future virtual bargaining that can coordinate social behavior—may provide a motivation for the 
enormous amount of time people spend in apparent “idle” conversation. Thus, although some 
anthropologists have assumed gossip to be an analog of grooming in non-human apes (e.g., 
Dunbar, 1998), it may be more appropriate to see conversation as establishing and solidifying the 
common ground for coordinating future behavior. This point is applicable particularly to what 
Clark (1996) calls personal common ground, which refers not to general background knowledge 
shared by the community at large, but to information shared by specific pairs or small groups of 
individuals. Building common ground through conversation and shared experiences seems to be 
a crucial part of building relationships, whether in friendships, romantic relationships, business 
partnerships, sports teams, or groups of workers.  
Affiliation and groups. If social interactions are coordinated by tacit agreements, then the 
degree to which we will wish to enter such interactions will depend on our expectations about 
how easily tacit agreements can be formed, and how far they will be followed rather than flouted. 
The ability to form such agreements, as we have seen, will depend crucially on common 
ground—so that interactions will, other things being equal, proceed more smoothly for people 
with similar backgrounds, training, experiences, and so on. Thus, in a telecoms company, 
managers with a background in sales may find it easier to form tacit agreements with each other 
than with the engineers, and vice versa. This may lead to increased levels of liking, friendship, 
and further interactions within rather than between groups, potentially reinforcing the differences 
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in common ground between sales people and the engineers. On the other hand, lack of diversity 
may reduce the range of knowledge and experience available and hence reduce the quality of the 
resulting decisions.  
A further interesting topic for future research is whether such effects are amplified by 
attribution errors arising from the curse of knowledge. If people in different groups tend to 
overestimate their common ground, then failed interactions are more likely to be attributed to 
“bad faith” on the part of the members of the other group. For example, if an engineer gives a 
technical explanation that is incomprehensible to the manager, this might arise because the 
engineer wrongly assumes this relevant technical knowledge as common ground. But it might be 
interpreted as a deliberate attempt to show off, obfuscate, or otherwise be unhelpful. This may be 
one of many forces maintaining in-groups and driving them away from out-groups, and more 
broadly causing people to affiliate with people they perceive to be like themselves. It might also 
suggest that contact between members of different groups may reduce such effects, especially if 
such contact leads to successful social coordination and collaboration (Paolini, Harwood, 
Hewstone, & Neumann, 2018). Indeed, recent experimental work suggests that even shared 
attention (e.g., to a brief video arguing for or against evolution by natural selection) may 
selectively increase liking for another person (Haj-Mohamadi, Fles, & Shteynberg, 2018). 
Perhaps tellingly, this effect only occurs if the shared information is congruent with a person’s 
beliefs (i.e., whether the person believes in natural selection or creationism). Where the new 
information is not congruent with their prior assumptions, the person is blocked from encoding it 
as common ground between them and their partner, because they do not believe it themselves.  
Relation to social norms. As we have seen, flexibility is a hallmark of human social 
interaction. From this standpoint, it seems misleading to think of the social life as guided 
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predominantly by “norms,” viewed as fixed rules of behavior like the rules of chess.23 Very 
subtle changes in the environment, or how a person acts or reacts, can completely change a social 
situation, depending on the underlying implicit agreements in play. Suppose two people 
approach a supermarket check-out at around the same time. If one person slows and waves to the 
other to go first, this may be interpreted as politely and helpfully breaking the deadlock. But 
suppose that a faster moving young person dashes slightly ahead of a slower moving older 
person. Now, if the older person slows and waves the other through, this may signal 
exasperation, or even hostility. The act of signaling draws attention to the deadlock, and that the 
younger person has “resolved” it, without agreement, to their own advantage. Slight 
exaggerations of the stopping and waving may intensify the communication of frustration. The 
younger person then faces the difficult question of whether to acknowledge the gesture, as if it 
were meant sincerely; to ignore it; or perhaps to apologize and let the older person go first. Such 
interactions are better viewed as complex, ad hoc, improvisations, rather than the playing out of a 
game according to fixed rules (Bertinetto & Bertram, 2020).  
Still, though, many interactions are repeated, so that particular patterns of behavior will 
become increasingly conventionalized (although any conventions will always be open to 
challenge, irony, exaggeration, subversion, and so on). Indeed, it is interesting to speculate that 
social norms may best be viewed as emergent patterns arising over time from specific 
improvised interactions, by analogy with the way in which many linguists and psychologists in 
the “usage-based” tradition see grammatical patterns as arising through gradual entrenchment of, 
and generalization from, specific uses (Hopper & Traugott, 1993; Tomasello, 2003). This 
viewpoint has the implication that virtual bargaining may be essential to the development of 
 
23 Although this may sometimes be a useful theoretical approximation (Hawkins, Goodman, & Goldstone, 
2019). 
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human communicative and social norms, and thus that species without the ability to engage in 
virtual bargaining would be unable to develop a complex culture.  
The importance of scripts, roles, and responsibilities. Many social situations (greetings, 
being seated or served by a waiter, going through a religious ritual, receiving a certificate at a 
school assembly) are governed by something close to standardized “scripts” (Schank & Abelson, 
1977), in which different participants have distinct roles and responsibilities. For example, a 
waiter is expected to ask a customer for their order, not the reverse; the waiter is responsible for 
passing the order to the chef, and so on. Where scripts are in common ground, they can, of 
course, substantially simplify the problem of social coordination—but a coordinated social 
interaction requires continual negotiation (and, often, repair) for the script to be “performed” 
successfully. The complexity of such coordination requires that most such negotiation cannot be 
mediated by language, but must be predominantly “virtual;” and the need for different parties to 
arrive at the same solution, out of multiple possibilities, raises, as ever, the paradox of social 
interaction: that each party is attempting to predict, and coordinate with, the actions of the other. 
So, for example, both the waiter and customer need to agree which table the waiter is attending 
to (the waiter may pass near a table, for example, merely to allow other customers to pass). They 
need to agree, too, when it is appropriate to request, or to place, and order (e.g., not if the waiter 
approaches the table with a dustpan and brush, after glass has been broken). Indeed, the virtual 
bargaining viewpoint meshes with a dramaturgical perspective on social behavior, as the joint 
creation of a shared “performance” (Goffman, 1959). 
Deciding who “we” are. We-reasoning, including virtual bargaining, begins from 
presumed common ground about who “we” are—that is, who the parties are in the social 
interaction. Simple physical presence is not, of course, sufficient. Thus, if one diner suggests 
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going to a movie to another, a waiter who is clearing the plates, or a diner at the next table, 
would not be expected to be included in the invitation. Thus, an important part of any social 
interaction is ensuring that there is common ground among participants that they are 
participants.24  
Misconstruing who is, or is not, engaged in a particular social interaction can itself be a 
source of social confusion and embarrassment—as when we wave back at someone who was 
signaling to someone else; or when taking a seat that is actually being offered to someone else. 
An open theoretical question concerns how one’s legitimate participation in a social interaction 
is itself commonly agreed. Assuming that this is itself achieved via virtual bargaining seems to 
raise the specter of circularity, because such bargaining itself presupposes an agreement about 
who is involved in the agreement. We suspect the circularity may be more apparent than real: 
that the question of who is in the virtual bargain is really part of the bargain itself (just as the 
terms of a business contract include the identities of the participating firms and individuals).  
Nonetheless, the issues here are subtle. For example, consider informal and apparently 
tacit conventions, such as those described by Sugden (1989): in a Yorkshire fishing village, 
anyone could mark a pile of driftwood as theirs (for later collection) by placing two stones on it. 
A villager could not, presumably, violate the rule and take driftwood for themselves merely by 
declaring that they were not part of the “bargain.” The normative force of the rule is that people 
in the relevant social group cannot simply declare themselves outside the bargain and hence not 
bound by it (even if they say that they do not object to others taking their driftwood). Relatedly, 
in some contexts, the question of who is party to a social interaction, and hence drawn into a 
virtual bargain, may be contentious: a fundraiser with a tin may wish to engage a hapless 
 
24 It need not be in common ground to non-participants that they are not included—indeed, non-participants 
to social interactions need not even be aware that the interaction is occurring. 
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shopper, creating mutual expectation of a donation to a good cause; the shopper may avoid eye 
contact and pretend not to notice the fundraiser’s existence, to avoid “implicitly agreeing” to be 
part of any such bargain.   
The question of who “we” are is likely to be closely linked to questions of social identity 
and group formation. A common identification that we are members of the same fishing 
community, regiment, religious group, political party, or nation may establish common ground 
that, in some ways at least, we are part of a common social unit, governed by an agreed social 
contract (e.g., to follow group norms, help each other, and so on). Thus, from this viewpoint, 
social identity (Tajfel, 1974) as being part of a group depends not just on self-identification as a 
group member, but may depend on group membership being in common ground within the group 
(“we all know who we are”). This common ground is required for group members to coordinate 
effectively through virtual bargaining. Indeed, work in the minimal group paradigm has long 
shown that merely establishing in people’s common ground that they have been divided into two 
arbitrary groups (e.g., randomly given red versus blue t-shirts) leads to greater cooperation 
within rather than between groups (e.g., Brewer, 1979). This is often interpreted as indicating 
greater liking for, and hence pro-social behavior towards, in-group than out-group members. 
According to the present perspective, this same manipulation might also be expected to 
differentiate performance even in so-called Schelling games (Schelling, 1960), where people are 
each rewarded if they independently make the same choice as each other from a number of 
options (e.g., colors, dates, numbers, locations). As we have noted, in coordination problems of 
this kind, enhanced pro-social motivation does not improve performance. What is crucial is the 
ability to imagine what “we” would agree were we able to discuss what would be most natural 
(e.g., “choose the most common color,” “choose January 1st,” etc.). By priming or suppressing 
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the “we” perspective through having people interact who are either in the same, or a different, 
arbitrary group, we would expect such inferences, and hence resulting coordination, to be 
enhanced or impeded. As far as we know, this prediction remains to be tested experimentally.  
A new perspective on reciprocation. Many mutually beneficial social and economic 
interactions unfold over time, in which A helps B on some occasions, and B helps A on others. 
Indeed, some patterns of mutual help and the common expectation of such help is often a 
foundation for mutually beneficial relationships, rather than momentary transactions, from 
friendships, to life-partnerships, to business partnerships, and alliances of all kinds. Patterns of 
reciprocation are puzzling for traditional reason-based models of behavior. To see why, consider 
the well-known “Centipede” game.25 The game has a fixed maximum number of alternating 
turns (e.g., 10) between two players. On each turn, the player whose turn it is to move can either 
(a) give up $1 of her own money, so that the other player receives $3; or (b) stop the game. Over 
time, both players benefit from reciprocal interaction: each gives away a number of $1 sums, and 
receives a roughly equal number of $3 sums. But if the game has a commonly known endpoint 
(e.g., each player can play just 10 trials), then a standard rational account is that no reciprocation 
is possible. Both players anticipate that the player with the final “turn” (say, A) will not send 
back a dollar (having nothing more to gain, because the other cannot reciprocate). They can then 
infer that B will not send back the dollar on the penultimate turn (knowing that A will not 
reciprocate on the final turn). Following this logic to the start of the game through “backward 
induction,” leads to the conclusion that reciprocation can never start. Or, to consider a related 
example, consider a finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) (Embrey, Frechette, & Yuksel, 
2018), in which each player can cooperate or defect on each turn (a simple version of Prisoner’s 
 
25 The Centipede game was originated in Rosenthal (1981). The version we describe here is Rosenthal’s 
original version, but many variations have since been developed and explored experimentally. 
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Dilemma is that, on each turn, both players simultaneously choose whether to give up $1 of their 
own money, so that the other player receives $3). On a single round of PD, of course, it is in each 
player’s interest to withhold their dollar (whatever the other does, this will leave them one dollar 
better off). But if PD is repeated, say, twenty times, then there is a substantial opportunity for 
mutual benefit by reciprocally cooperating. As in the Centipede game, rational agents seem 
unable to obtain such benefits, because of the logic of “backward induction:” both know that 
defection will occur on the last trial; so it is rational to defect on the second to last trial, and the 
third to last, all the way to the beginning of the game. So, the apparently substantial opportunity 
for reciprocation (I’ll help you, if you help me) appears inaccessible. In practice, people typically 
do engage in high levels of cooperation in both the Centipede and finitely repeated PD games, 
though sometimes ceasing cooperation near the very end of the game (Embrey et al., 2018; 
García-Pola, Iriberri, & Kovárík, 2018).26  
The virtual bargaining viewpoint outlined here suggests that reciprocation need not be 
treated as a distinct phenomenon (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2000b), but rather viewed as a special 
case of reaching a virtual agreement.  Specifically, virtual bargaining can tell the players that, 
were they able to communicate, they would agree to be cooperative—i.e., to keep paying across 
sums of $1 until the end of the game. While this hypothetical agreement is in common ground, 
each player may reasonably wonder: “what happens if I stick to the agreement, but the other 
“exploits” my doing so to their own best advantage?” In the Centipede and finitely repeated PD 
 
26 The picture is different where the PD is repeated indefinitely; then, the so-called “folk theorem” of game 
theory applies, which states that (typically) a wide variety of outcomes is rationally justifiable (e.g., Gintis, 2000)—
but the players then face the coordination problem of simultaneously alighting on the same one, which has been the 
primary topic here. Thus, the need for virtual bargaining, or some similar mechanism, recurs in a rational account of 
infinitely repeated PDs. With one-shot PDs, virtual bargaining does not necessarily generate a cooperative outcome. 
By contrast, with the finitely repeated PD, a virtual bargain to cooperate throughout is credible, because even if one 
agent follows the agreement and the other best-responds, this implies that defection will only occur on the last turn, 
so that both agents can accrue significant benefits for prior cooperation. 
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games, the best way to exploit someone who dutifully follows the virtual agreement is to 
continually cooperate until the very last turn. By exploiting the dutiful player only at the last 
moment, the selfish player gains all the accumulated benefits of mutual cooperation, and thus 
maximizes their own payoff. Crucially, however, the payoff to the dutiful player is still high, 
because they, too, gain the accumulated benefits of mutual cooperation, except when exploited 
on the very last turn. So, the players can anticipate a good outcome for themselves from the 
agreement to cooperate to the end of the game, even where they suspect that the other might 
secretly intend to act selfishly. Each player can reason, “Of course, I can trust myself to stick to a 
virtual agreement to cooperate throughout the game; and even if the other player selfishly 
exploits me, my outcome is still good. So, this is a good agreement for me, whether the other 
person sticks to the agreement or behaves selfishly.” And this reasoning is itself in common 
ground, so it is commonly known to both parties that the agreement is mutually advantageous 
and resilient against exploitation (for a formal analysis, see Melkonyan et al., 2021).  
This perspective is very different from many “algorithmic” perspectives on reciprocation, 
according to which people (or artificial agents) follow rules, such as tit-for-tat, which are 
assumed to have “evolved” either through cultural or biological evolution (e.g., Axelrod & 
Hamilton, 1981 and the large subsequent literature). By contrast, the present viewpoint sees 
reciprocation as a paradigm example of a “social contract” which will be in common ground to 
both parties, with common expectations that the contract will be fulfilled (and the expectation of 
complaint to, or even punishment of, the other if it is not).  
To see the difference, consider a (real) case in which A tidies B’s garden each week; and 
each week B gives A a bottle of wine. It turns out that A does not drink wine, and hence the 
“reciprocation” is entirely void, with the bottles simply accumulating undrunk. A nonetheless 
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feels obligated to continue tending B’s garden, rather than violating the unspoken agreement 
(although clearly an agreement has arisen due to a misunderstanding). Suppose A were to 
discover that B does not drink wine (and B were to know that A had discovered this). Then, a 
conventional rational analysis would lead to the conclusion that A could abruptly stop giving 
wine, and expect B to tend the garden as before (reasoning that B must enjoy the gardening for 
its own sake, as reciprocation is clearly not B’s motive). Yet this would almost certainly be 
viewed as extremely rude, and B might very well cease gardening at once. Instead, A would need 
to find some other (one hopes more successful) way of reciprocating—thus forming a new tacit 
“contract” with B (perhaps B could take produce or flowers from the garden). Or suppose A goes 
on a summer holiday for two weeks, and hence misses a “payment” of wine to B. In such novel 
circumstances, the two parties may not have sufficient basis for coordinating on the same virtual 
bargain, and hence disagreements may arise. Quite likely B will garden anyway, and anticipate 
two bottles of wine on A’s return. But A might provide just one bottle, assuming that a single 
bottle is a token of appreciation, rather than an implicit “payment” per week for A’s gardening. 
There would be at least the possibility that B might feel affronted if A did not provide some extra 
token of appreciation on her return, even if the token is entirely unwanted. Indeed, irritation and 
even anger are likely to be common responses when virtual bargaining fails.  
These patterns of thought and behavior are intuitively natural, and make sense if both 
parties think they have entered a tacit agreement. But they do not follow from any algorithmic 
account of reciprocation, for example, following a rule such as tit-for-tat.27 Furthermore, this 
 
27 In evolutionary game theory (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981), algorithmic strategies such as tit-for-tat are 
primitive behavioral patterns which are selected for over repeated interactions between agents. Thus, the algorithms 
that predominate are those which have met with greatest success in the past. By contrast, in the virtual bargaining 
approach, strategies (which may include tit-for-tat) arise through a process of forward-looking choice, in view of 
their likely success in the current interaction.  
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viewpoint helps explain why people may reject help from another, when this is apparently 
against their interests—because accepting help may, in some contexts, signal tacit acceptance of 
a mutual bond of reciprocal support to which one party may be reluctant to sign up (as when one 
accepts an offer of help from the mafia, Gambetta, 1996).  
Links with other types of contract-based theorizing in psychology. The present account of 
how “social contracts” are improvised in the moment has interesting parallels in other ideas in 
psychology. In the psychology of language, Brennan and Clark (1996) propose that “conceptual 
pacts” coordinate moment-by-moment communication (a conceptual pact might be: “let’s call 
this odd-shaped tangram pattern ‘the rocket’” or “in this conversation, ‘Ali’ refers to my friend 
rather than the legendary boxer”). More broadly, social scientists frequently talk of people 
negotiating meanings, identities, and relationships (e.g., Thomas, Sargent, & Hardy, 2011)—but 
of course much of this negotiation is not explicit, and may perhaps usefully be considered as 
stemming from virtual bargaining.  
A second connection focuses on a putative psychological contract between employees 
and companies (Argyris, 1960; Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau & Shperling, 2003). Again, virtual 
bargaining provides a potential for understanding how such psychological contracts can become 
established without, or with a minimum of, explicit communication. We believe that it is crucial 
to understand such contracts as jointly recognized and understood. Thus, for example, if a 
worker is not treated as they expect by their employer (e.g., their hours and pay are reduced 
without prior notice), their outrage is, we suspect, not merely that the employer has deviated 
from the employee’s understanding of their implicit agreement. It is rather that the employer has 
knowingly and willfully violated an implicit agreement to which they had both “signed up.” The 
employee thus feels a sense not merely of having been maltreated, but betrayed. It may therefore 
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be useful to recast the important literature on psychological contracts from the viewpoint that 
psychological contracts are joint contracts (or at least are perceived as joint contracts), rather 
than being mentally represented by a single individual.  
A third related theoretical idea is what Rousseau (1989) called “implied” contracts. These 
are implicit rules by which society at large guides and governs relationships (e.g., between 
employee and employer), whether or not these are mentally represented by either party. What is 
the status of such implied contracts? We suggest that they may be analogous to the rules 
governing language, which are not explicitly formulated by any individual speaker but are 
distributed through a linguistic community. The parallel with language also suggests that implied 
contracts, and implicit social norms more generally, may become established over time through 
the gradual accumulation of virtual bargains each of which deals with specific circumstances. 
Each new virtual bargain will build on those that have gone before, via processes of 
entrenchment and generalization, potentially producing an increasingly conventionalized, rule-
like system.  
Relation to moral reasoning. These considerations suggest, more broadly, that social 
interactions are governed by tacit agreements with a “moral” dimension. That is, a commitment 
to the “rightness” of the tacit agreement, having an obligation to uphold it, and accepting the 
appropriateness of chastising or punishing those who violate it without good cause, is part of 
committing to the agreement itself. Indeed, when people violate tacit agreements, even in low-
stakes social interactions concerned with seating preferences, borrowing pens, or handing each 
other books, the reaction of others can range from mild irritation to outrage. More broadly, a 
model of social interaction founded on mutual tacit agreements, rather than second-guessing the 
thoughts and actions of another (who is second-guessing one’s own), explains the inherently 
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normative nature of social behavior, and that social norms are typically viewed as common 
ground between participants.  
From a traditional individualistic perspective, it is natural to think of people as focused 
primarily on the consequences of their own and other people’s actions. From this point of view, 
we might expect people to praise and reward the actions of others that have positive 
consequences for them, and to punish the actions of those that have bad consequences for them 
(which might be the foundation of reciprocal cooperation, Fehr & Gächter, 2000a). But the 
examples above indicate that people are also greatly concerned with people following tacit (and 
indeed explicit) agreements. From this point of view, the human ability to engage in coordinated 
social behavior may be continuous with our sense of the “appropriate” way to behave (March & 
Olsen, 2008), a viewpoint that is consistent with developmental evidence (e.g., Tomasello, 
2020). Indeed, if rules of local social interaction are continuous with wider moral thinking, then 
virtual bargaining may provide a starting point for understanding moral thinking more broadly, 
and especially those that naturally flow from contractarian approaches to ethics (e.g., Gauthier, 
1986; Scanlon, 1998).  
Virtual bargaining and verbal communication. We have argued that virtual bargaining 
provides a mechanism through which people can coordinate their behavior without 
communication. But even where verbal communication is possible, the paradox of social 
interaction, and the need to resolve it by virtual bargaining or a similar mechanism, still arises. 
Communicative signals—from facial expressions, to gestures, to complex symbolic language—
are invariably highly ambiguous (Christiansen & Chater, 2022), and require complex pragmatic 
processes to determine a specific meaning (Clark, 1996; Grice, 1975; Levinson, 2000; Sperber & 
Wilson, 1986). Communication will only succeed, of course, where the speaker and hearer alight 
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on the same meaning. Thus, the pragmatic inference involved in interpreting a communicative 
signal is a paradigm example of a coordination problem. Suppose the speaker points vaguely and 
asks, “Can you pass me that one?” The speaker has to work out (among other things) what the 
hearer thinks “that one” is; and the hearer has to work out what the speaker thinks “that one” is. 
This problem of mutual prediction cannot be resolved by any amount of recursive mentalizing 
(Clark, 1996).  
Although further communication may help resolve uncertainty (Healey, Mills, Eshghi, & 
Howes, 2018), any such communication will itself be ambiguous and need further interpretation. 
Virtual bargaining provides a possible route for breaking out of this regress: in the light of their 
common ground, both parties ask, “Given our objectives, what would be the most efficient way 
to map possible signals to meanings?” If they can jointly infer a signal-meaning mapping in the 
present communicative context, given their common ground, then this mapping can be applied 
by both parties to interpret whatever signal happens to be sent. For example, if the two people 
are doing some DIY together and have a pile of tools on the floor between them, “that one” must 
be a screwdriver, given their common ground that their current task is fixing a screw to the wall. 
If the speaker wanted the hammer right next to the screwdriver, they would need to be more 
specific (“that hammer”). The shorter, simpler phrase is reserved for the most salient 
interpretation, given their common ground, which follows standard efficiency considerations 
(e.g., Gibson et al., 2019). This approach is in the spirit of Clark’s (1996) theory of 
communication, and has been recently developed using the virtual bargaining framework and 
related work (Bundy, Philalithis, & Li, 2021; Chater & Misyak, 2021; Stacy et al., 2021).  
How much virtual bargaining is carried out ‘in the moment’? An important direction for 
future work is to clarify whether and when virtual bargaining occurs in the moment, or whether it 
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is better considered as a “rational analysis” (e.g., Anderson, 1990; Chater & Oaksford, 1999) for 
repetitive behavior that is long-established through individual learning or cultural evolution. This 
issue arises, of course, throughout psychology: for example, in considering instance-based versus 
algorithmic theories of skill learning (e.g., Logan, 1988), construction vs rule-based views of 
syntax (e.g., Ziegler, Bencini, Goldberg, & Snedeker, 2019), Gricean-style natural language 
pragmatics (Goodman & Frank, 2016), or the interpretation of metaphor (Glucksberg, 2003). 
Such questions are, of course, typically difficult to answer in any domain. We suggest, though, 
that the flexibility of social interactions, and their responsiveness to very subtle communicative 
cues or shifts in background knowledge (see, e.g., the astonishing flexibility of the interpretation 
of newly encountered communicative signals, e.g., Clark, 1996; Galantucci, 2005; Misyak, 
Noguchi, & Chater, 2016), suggests that a good deal of processing must be improvised in each 
fresh communicative interaction. Nonetheless, as with skill learning more broadly, it is likely 
that each new social interaction will be shaped by prior experience of similar interactions, 
gradually leading to the “entrenchment” of certain patterns of behavior.  Thus, as noted above, 
systems of increasingly rule-like patterns in behavior would be expected to arise both during 
learning and development within the individual, and within newly formed social groups. At each 
point, though, social behavior seems highly malleable and adaptable to the demands of the 




The shared intentionality of social interaction, and the mutual dependence of the minds, is 
ubiquitous and relatively uncontroversial. Yet it appears to have paradoxical consequences for 
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many theories of the psychological foundations of social behavior. In particular, a theoretical 
circularity seems to arise where A’s thoughts and actions depend on A’s interpretation of B’s 
thoughts and actions; yet B’s thoughts and actions depend on B’s interpretation of A’s thoughts 
and actions. Even formulating this apparent problem of circularity leaves one feeling rather 
befuddled. It seems initially possible that this might be no more than a pseudo-problem, 
somehow generated by loose argument or use of language; or perhaps a genuine conceptual 
puzzle, but one with few implications for the psychologist. We suggest the opposite: that the 
mutual prediction that is essential to social interactions generates a paradox that psychological 
theories ignore at their peril. Thus, theoretical accounts that see social interaction as involving 
each person predicting the other’s behavior (Tamir & Thornton, 2018), reading their mental 
states (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992), or forming first-, second-, or higher-order beliefs about others 
(e.g., Liddle & Nettle, 2006) will inevitably be incomplete. More generally, theories that aim to 
explain social behavior in terms of reasons are coherent only to the extent that the reasons that 
they provide are rationally coherent—and hence free of paradoxes. We have seen that in the 
context of reciprocal social interactions avoiding paradox is surprisingly difficult. 
In this paper, we have considered simple social interactions in which the paradox arises 
very starkly, even though the “natural” solution is highly intuitive. Thus, social interaction seems 
profoundly different from either social perception (interpreting the behavior of others through 
observation) or social action (one-way influence on the behavior of others). This observation has, 
we believe, an important implication for the empirical study of social behavior—that by 
abstracting away from interaction, as has been common in social psychology for many decades, 
psychologist are missing a crucial aspect of social cognition and behavior.  
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The solution to the paradox of social interaction requires, we have argued, thinking about 
what “we” should do—a shift from I-thinking to we-thinking. And the virtual bargaining account 
aims to explain we-thinking without invoking the shadowy notion of a group mind. Instead, we 
propose that individuals can we-reason successfully by asking: what would we agree, if we can 
discussion and bargain? Where the result of such simulated virtual bargaining is self-evident to 
all parties, then results of such bargaining can be followed directly. Understanding the nature and 
limits of virtual bargaining, how people decide who is part of the bargain, how the common 
ground underpinning virtual bargaining is established, and how the potential for successful 
virtual bargaining affects whether people wish to join or maintain relations, or group 
membership, remains interesting questions for future research. As we have seen, virtual 
bargaining provides a possible mechanism for the cumulative creation and entrenchment of 
linguistic conventions and social norms. Moreover, the normative force of virtual bargaining—
that participants in the bargain feel that they and others ought to follow it—raises interesting 
connections with moral psychology. 
The argument of this paper has implications for how computational models of non-social 
behavior in the cognitive and brain sciences may extend to social interaction. Computational 
theories of human cognition, rooted in cognitive science, machine learning, artificial intelligence, 
and neuroscience, have become increasingly sophisticated and successful. Yet, we argue, these 
models are, in a specific and we suggest important sense, asocial. Specifically, the mutual 
prediction in social interaction—the fact that each participant is attempting to predict, respond to, 
and accommodate the thoughts and actions of the other—lies outside the scope of such models. 
Indeed, the attempt to apply standard models of human cognition to mutual social interaction 
leads, as we have seen, to paradoxical results. 
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According to the argument of this paper, the process of virtual bargaining is fundamental 
to the human ability to engage in complex social interactions.  Yet we are often oblivious to this 
process of bargaining in part, we suggest, because the highly sophisticated social reasoning 
underpinning our interactions is so familiar and natural to us. Just as we have the illusion of 
“direct” contact with the visual environment, unaware of the spectacularly complex calculations 
carried out by our visual brains (e.g., Ullman, 1980), so the world of social interaction seems 
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Area of psychology Social perception: 
Understanding the 
behavior of others 
Social influence: 
Shaping the thoughts 
and behavior of others 
Social transmission: The 
propagation of thoughts 
and behavior  
Social interaction: Two-
way interplay of agent’s 
behavior 




from faces (Todorov, 
Olivola, Dotsch, & 
Mende-Siedlecki, 2015)  
 
Implicit processes in 
evaluating others 
















(Fischer et al., 2011) 
 
Automatic imitation 
(Cracco et al., 2018) 
 
Emotional contagion 
(Hatfield, Cacioppo, & 
Rapson, 1993) 
 
Transmission of beliefs 




(Haney, Banks, & 
Zimbardo, 1973) 
 
Impact of shared attention 
on cognition, emotion and 
affiliation (Haj-Mohamadi 
et al., 2018) 
 
Social and cognitive 
development 
“Theory of mind” tasks 
(Wimmer & Perner, 
1983) 
 
Inferring goals (Gergely, 
Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 
1995; Hamlin, Wynn, & 
Bloom, 2007) 
 
Socialization of moral 
norms (Grusec & 
Goodnow, 1994) 
 
Children enforcing social 
norms on others 
(Schmidt & Tomasello, 
2012) 
 
Imitation of facial 
expressions in neonates 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; 
Oostenbroek et al., 2016) 
 
Imitating aggressive 
behavior (Bandura, Ross, 
& Ross, 1961) 
 
Rational imitation in 
infants (Gergely, 
Bekkering, & Kiraly, 
2002) 
Early shared intentionality 
(Tomasello & Carpenter, 
2007) 
 
Helping behavior in infants 







Chimps infer food 
location from gaze 




depends on what others 





apparently attempt to 
mislead others on 
location of food (Byrne 
& Whiten, 1989) 
 
Animal signaling as 
manipulation (Dawkins 
& Krebs, 1978) 
 
Collection action in 
animal groups (Couzin, 
Krause, Franks, & Levin, 
2005) 
 





Cultural learning (Heyes & 
Galef Jr, 1996) 
 
Possible ‘teaching’ 
between animals (Hoppitt 
et al., 2008) 
 
Joint attention (Povinelli & 
Eddy, 1996) 
 
Joint action (Bullinger, 






Table 1. Social perception, influence, transmission, and interaction in studies in social, developmental, and comparative psychology. 
While interaction seems central to social behavior, many fields of research focus on one-directional relationships between people: how 
people interpret, influence, or transmit information or behavior to each other. These phenomena can be studied without facing the 
problem of mutual interdependence that generates the paradox of social interaction: that in social interaction each person is trying to 










Theory-theory Each person formulates a 
‘theory’ of the other’s 
beliefs and desires 
 
Circularity: A’s theory of 







Simulation theories Each person uses their 
own mind to simulate 
another’s 
 
Circularity: A simulates B 







Each person is a 
“prediction machine” who 
best-responds to what she 
predicts the other will do 
 
Circularity: A’s choice 
depends on its prediction 
of B’s choice; B’s choice 
depends on its prediction 








theory; k-level reasoning; 
higher-order intentionality  
 
Depends on heuristics 
concerning the “0th” 
recursive level 
 
Camerer et al. 
(2004); Stahl and 
Wilson (1994) 
 
Bayesian models of 
mutual prediction 
Softmax choice rule and 
iterate to find “fixed 
points”  
 




Shafto et al. 
(2014) 
 
Rational speech act 
theory 
 
Iterate to find “fixed 
points”  
 






Nash equilibrium Each person best-responds 
to the other’s strategy 






Rationalizability Each person optimizes in 
light of their own beliefs. 
Solving for “fixed points” 
 
Problem of choosing 







Table 2. Individualistic approaches to the problem of reasoning about social interaction in 
psychology, philosophy, and economics. 
 
